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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On or about August 17, 2006 a judgment was entered in favor of Alan J. Prince
against Rosalind Cazares in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, case no. 05092074. R.74-76, R. 174-175.

2.

For value received, the judgment was assigned to Pamela Cosby by Alan J.
Prince on or about August 29, 2007. R.79-80, R.1J5.

3.

In an effort to recover the judgment, Pamela Cosby caused a Writ of Execution
and praecipe to be issued by the Third Judicial District Court, wherein all of
Rosalind Cazares' interest in the Estate of Rosemary Cosby was attached and
ordered to be sold. R.70, R.175.

4.

The Salt Lake County Sheriff served notice by leaving a copy of the same with
Adrian Jefferson. R.71, R.175.

5.

Adrian Jefferson is the son of Rosalind Cazares. R,71, R.175.

6.

Jefferson claimed his mother did not live with him and alleged that therefore
service on him was not proper. R.71, R.175.

7.

A new praecipe and writ were executed and issued by the court and then
served by Constable Sindt. R.71, R.175.

8.

Constable Sindt set the property for sale. R.71, R.175

9.

On the morning of the sale, Rosalind Cazares filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy,
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without all of the necessary statements and schedules, (case # 08-21504) R.71,
R.175.
10.

On April 24, 2008, Pamela Cosby filed a Motion for Relief from Automatic
Stay which was scheduled for hearing on May 19, 2008. R.71, R.175.

11.

On April 30, 2008, an Order dismissing the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section
521(i) was entered. R.71, R.175.

12.

Mrs. Cosby again set a sale for execution on her judgment. R.71, R.175.

13.

The Sale was scheduled for May 23, 2008. R.71, R.176.

14.

On the morning of May 23, 2008, Cazares again filed a Chapter 13
Bankruptcy. R.71, R.176.

15.

Just as previously, Cazares filed the bankruptcy solely to delay the sale by Mrs.
Cosby. R.71, R.176.

16.

Just as previously, the filing by the Debtors failed to meet the requirements of
the Bankruptcy code. R.71, R.176.

17.

The sworn statements and schedules filed in the bankruptcy showed Cazares to
be insolvent. R.71, R.176.

18.

On February 12, 2009 Cazares' bankruptcy was dismissed by the federal
bankruptcy court for willfully failing to comply with the orders of the
bankruptcy court. R.71-72, R.176.

19.

Mrs. Cosby again set the estate interest for sale on April 10, 2009. R.72, R.176.

20.

Fifteen minutes prior to the scheduled time for the sale, Adrian Jefferson
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appeared at the constable's office. R.72, R.92, R.176.
21.

Jefferson is the son of Cazares. R.72, R.176.

22.

Jefferson was aware that Cazares had been in bankruptcy and that she was
insolvent. R.72, R.176.

23.

Jefferson presented a document entitled Assignment to the constable and
claimed that pursuant to the assignment he was the owner of the property R.92,
R.176.

24.

Jefferson also threatened to sue the constable if he proceeded with the sale.
R.92-93, R.176.

25.

In spite of Jefferson's threats the constable proceeded with the sale and Mrs
Cosby was the successful bidder for the sum of $5,000.00. R.93, R.176.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Plaintiff brought this action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of an interest in
the Estate of Rosemary Cosby from Rosalind Cazares to her son Adrian Jefferson. In her
memorandum filed in support of her motion for summary judgment the Ms. Cosby set
forth 25 undisputed facts. The Defendants did not dispute any of these facts. When a
party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and fails to file any
responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials the trial court may properly conclude
that there are no disputed issues of material fact. Walter v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042 (Utah
2003). The Trial Court did deem the facts admitted and Defendants have not appealed
those findings.
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In their responsive pleadings, the Defendants likewise did not challenge the legal
argument that the transfer from Cazares to Jefferson was a fraudulent conveyance. The
Trial Court found as a matter of law that the conveyance was fraudulent. The Defendants
have not appealed that Finding.
Defendants' sole argument, on appeal, is that the execution and sale to Pamela
Cosby is somehow invalid. To support this claim, the Defendants first claim that an
interest in an estate cannot be executed on. Defendants cite no Utah authority that
supports their position. In fact, Utah authority is completely to the contrary. A vested
estate interest is a chose in action. Under Utah law a chose in action may be executed on
by a creditor. In this case the estate interest of Rosalind Cazares had become fully vested
upon the death of her mother and the lapse of the period of time for disclaimer. Both
conditions had been fully met in this case. Indeed Ms. Cazares5 interest in the estate had
been determined by an order of the Probate Court.
Finally, the Defendants' argue that allowing Ms. Cosby to execute on Cazares'
interest in the estate is against public policy. Utah law however is directly to the contrary.
Defendants have waived any argument with respect to the determination of the facts in
this case. Neither the Facts nor the Law support the issues raised by Defendants on
Appeal and accordingly the Appeal should be denied.
ARGUMENT
I. AN INTEREST IN AN ESTATE MAY BE EXECUTED ON.
The Defendants first argument is that an heir's interest in an estate is not subject to
4

execution and sale. In the case of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980
P.2d 208 (Utah 1999) the Utah Supreme Court was asked to decide the issue of
whether a legal malpractice claim could be reached through execution. In deciding the
question the court addressed whether a chose in action could be executed on. The
Court stated:
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a sheriff shall "execute the
writ [of execution] against the non-exempt property of the judgment debtor by
levying on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient property; collecting
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property in the manner set forth
herein." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f). A "chose in action" has been defined as "a claim or
debt upon which a recovery may be made in a lawsuit. It is not a present
possession, but merely a right to sue; it becomes a 'possessory thing1 only upon
successful completion of a lawsuit." Barron's Law Dictionary 71 (3d ed.1991).
Accordingly, we hold that a legal malpractice claim, like any other chose in action,
may ordinarily be acquired by a creditor through attachment and execution.
While this is a question of first impression in Utah, we note that a number of states
permit a "judgment creditor to execute upon a judgment debtor's cause of action
against its insurer." Denham v. Farmers Ins. Co., 213 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1070, 262
Cal.Rptr. 146, 151 (Ct.App.1989) (referencing Bergen v. F/VSt. Patrick, 686
F.Supp. 786 (D.Alaska 1988); Whitehead v. VanLeuven, 347 F.Supp. 505 (D.Idaho
1972); Steffens v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 181 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa
1970)). Medical malpractice claims, for example, have been held to be subject to
attachment and execution by creditors. Woody's Olympia Lumber, Inc. v. Roney, 9
Wash.App. 626, 513 P.2d 849, 850-54 (1973). The Denham court interpreting
Nevada law, held that, absent direct language to the contrary, all causes of action
are subject to execution. See Denham, 262 Cal.Rptr. at 152. Like Nevada, Utah's
rules of civil procedure contain no direct language exempting causes of action from
execution.(fnl) See Utah R. Civ. P. 69. Rather, as the court of appeals noted, the
term "chose in action" is used "in the Utah version of Rule 69 without restriction of
any sort." Tanassee, 929 P.2d at 354. Thus, we view rule 69 to encompass all
choses in action, including causes of action for legal malpractice
Snow at 210.
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, all choses in action are subject to execution.
5

"A chose in action has been defined as a claim or debt upon which a recovery may be
made in a lawsuit." Supra. The item that was executed on was all of Rosalind Cazares5
rights in The Estate of Rosemary Cosby which were the subject of a law suit then pending
in front of the Hon. Lee A. Dever.Civ. # 990902004. As such it was a chose in action and
subject to execution.
Defendants have claimed that the legal treatise of American Jurisprudence contains
authority that stands for the prohibition of execution on estate interests. This is not true,
but even if it were the Snow case is controlling authority in Utah not Am Jur.
American Jurisprudence addresses the issue of execution on estate interests at 30
Am. Jur. 2d §156. There it states:
An heir or devisee, or legatee, who has a legal interest in realty which he or she
may convey has an interest which may be subject to levy, under execution to pay
his or her debts. More over, and although there is authority to the contrary it is not
necessary that the personal representative of the estate has fully closed up the
administration of the estate in order to render the interest of the heir subject to
execution.
Until a legacy vests in the legatee it cannot be taken on execution against the
legatee.
Contrary to the representation of the Defendants, Am Jur clearly states that an
execution may be made on an estate interest. Am Jur fs only suggested prohibition is that
such an interest cannot be taken prior to the interest vesting. Rosalind Cazares' interest
vested upon the death of her mother, and the lapse of the period for disclaimer. UCA §752-801 provides that a disclaimer of interest must be made within nine months after the
death of the deceased owner. In the probate litigation the judge had already issued an
6

order determining heirs. Since Cazares was fully vested at the time of the execution the
execution was valid.
Cazares herself recognized the validity of her vesting in that she sold a portion of
her interest by voluntary conveyance to an inheritance funding company. Subsequently
she tried to divest herself of her remainder interest through the fraudulent conveyance to
her son. By her own sworn statement she represented she was the owner of the estate.
She should not be allowed to flip flop her position on her ownership interest as a matter of
convenience to defraud her creditors.
II. EXECUTION ON A CHOSE IN ACTION IS NOT AGAINST PUBLIC
POLICY.
The Defendants next argue that the execution must be set aside as being against
public policy. As support for that position they cite to the case of Snow v. Tannasse, 929
P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1999). This case was the lower court decision to the Supreme Court
case cited by Plaintiff above.
In the Supreme Court decision they made it clear that the public policy
consideration is only in relation to malpractice actions between a lawyer and his or her
clients. Snow at 212.
This position was further clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Applied
Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699 (Utah 2002). There the Court stated:
Heritage Trust also contends that Dr. Hill improperly purchased Heritage Trust's
claims filed against Dr. Hill and others in the consolidated case because f![p]ublic
[pjolicy dictates that a person [should] not be able to acquire a chose in action
against itself by means of writ of execution or other forced sale." In making this
argument, Heritage Trust relies upon Tanasse, in which, indeed, this court held as a
7

matter of public policy that a law firm could not purchase a legal malpractice claim
pending against the law firm at a sheriffs sale. See 1999 UT 49 at 1ffll2--l3, 980
P.2d 208. However, while we stated in Tanasse that public policy concerns
included both the effect of denying the plaintiff the right to a trial on his claims and
the preclusion of a fair valuation of those claims, we clearly stated that additional
public policy concerns were present when dealing with lawyers. We explained:
We recognize that both of the above-described problems are present in every
situation in which a judgment creditor seeks to execute on an action pending
against it. However, in situations like the present, in which the attorney-client
relationship is at issue, these problems take on special significance. Allowing
lawyers and law firms to execute on legal malpractice actions pending against them
may significantly undermine the public trust in the legal profession and process and
compromise the relationship.
Id. at Ifl5.
TJ20 Lawyers, as attorneys and counselors at law, are officers of the courts of this
state and take a special oath subjecting them to the Rules of Professional Conduct
promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct preamble; see
also Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, f 34, 34 P.3d 194. Because of their
legal training and experience, lawyers are in an advantageous position that enables
them to appraise the merits of a claim, the amount of damages that they could
incur, and the duration of potential litigation. Lawyers often know confidential
information regarding former clients, such as their former clients' weaknesses and
financial conditions. All of the foregoing places a lawyer in a position to take
advantage of a client if the lawyer were allowed to purchase that client's
malpractice claim against the lawyer and then move for dismissal of the claim. See
Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 172, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (1962) (stating that
attorneys are "not permitted to take advantage of [their] position[s] or superior
knowledge"); see also In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 342, 130 P. 217, 240-41 (1913)
(recognizing that attorneys have legal technical knowledge that general public
lacks). Thus, we concluded in Tanasse that "public confidence in both the legal
profession and the legal process as a whole would be damaged if lawyers were
allowed to execute on legal malpractice claims brought against them." 1999 UT 49
at ^fl6. Therefore, in that case, pursuant to our constitutional duty to regulate and
supervise the actions of attorneys in the practice of law, see Utah Const, art. VIII, §
4, we determined that such public policy considerations were sufficient bases to
hold that attorneys and law firms could not purchase legal malpractice claims
against themselves with the intention of extinguishing those claims. Tanasse, 1999
UT49atffi[12, 18.
Tf21 Heritage Trust now urges us to extend the Tanasse exception to bar Dr. Hill
from purchasing claims against himself. The claims that Dr. Hill purchased were
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stock claims. Neither party has alleged that the agreement between Dr. Hill and Mr.
Eames regarding the formation of Applied Medical and the disbursement and
allocation of shares in Applied Medical was anything but an arm's-length business
transaction. This is simply a case of a nonlawyer, Dr. Hill, purchasing claims
against himself at a sheriffs sale. Unlike our holding in Tcmasse, which we based
on the public policy of protecting the integrity of the legal process, 1999 UT 49 at
ffl|15 16, here, where neither the attorney-client relationship nor the legal process is
sullied or damaged and there are no other policy reasons to extend the exception to
the general rule we articulated in Tanasse, we are reluctant to hold that nonlawyers
may not purchase claims against them solely on the basis of public policy not
derived from constitutional or statutory law. Therefore, we decline to enlarge the
exception recognized in Tanasse.
While the Eames case clearly puts to rest the public policy argument, it should be
pointed out that in this case the chose being acquired is not even an action against Mrs.
Cosby. Accordingly the public policy concerns are inapplicable here.
CONCLUSION
Defendants failed to object to any of the facts or the legal argument establishing
that the transfer from Cazares to Jefferson was a fraudulent transfer. Instead they argue
only that as a matter of law and public policy the interest in the estate could not be
executed on. As clearly defined by the Utah Supreme Court neither of these positions has
any merit and Ms. Cosby therefore respectfully requests that Defendants' appeal be
denied.
Dated this Af day of July, 2010

Shawn D. Turner
Attorney for Plaintiff
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